CONFIDENTIAL! 

FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY 


NOT  TO  BE  TAKEN  INTO  FRONT  LINE  TRENCHES 


NOTES  ON 
RECENT  OPERATIONS 

No.  2 


EDITED  AT  THE  A  RMY  WAR  COLLEGE 
FROM  FRENCH  AND  BRITISH  SOURCES 


JULY, 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1917 


WAR  DEPARTMENT 

Document  Xo.  641 
Office  of  The  Adjutant  General 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

WASHINGTON,  August  1,  1917. 

The  following  Notes  on  Recent  Operations,  No.  2,  is  published 
for  the  information  of  all  concerned. 

(300.6,  A.  O.  O.) 
BY  ORDER  OP  THE  SECRETARY  OP  WAR: 

TASKER  H.  BLISS, 
Major  General,  Acting  Chief  of  Staff. 
OFFICIAL: 

H.  P.  McCAIX, 

The  Adjutant  General. 

(3) 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
THE  ADJUTANT  GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

Washington,  June  19,  1917. 
To  all  officers  of  the  Army: 

You  are  advised  that  this  and  all  subsequent  documents  of  a 
similar  character  which  may  be  furnished  to  you  from  this  office  are 
to  be  regarded  as  strictly  confidential.  They  are  to  be  kept  at  all 
times  in  your  personal  possession,  and  are  not  to  be  copied,  nor  are 
any  parts  of  their  contents  to  be  communicated  either  directly  or 
indirectly  to  the  press,  nor  to  any  persons  not  in  the  military  or 
naval  service  of  the  United  States.  In  Europe  these  documents 
are  not  to  be  carried  into  the  front-line  trenches,  nor  farther  to  the 
front  than  the  usual  post  of  the  officers  to  whom  issued. 

Strict  compliance  with  this  injunction  is  enjoined  upon  every 
officer  into  whose  hands  any  of  these  confidential  documents  may 
come. 
By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War: 

H.  P.  MCCAIN, 
The  Adjutant  General. 
(4) 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

Page. 

1.  Notes  on  fortification  shelters  in  the  position  warfare  of 

the  present  time 7 

2.  German  land  mines 11 

3.  Combat  in  woods 22 

4.  Mont  Cornillet  Tunnel 25 

5.  Tactical  principles  in  defensive  combat,  position  warfare..  27 

6.  Methods  of  German  infantry  attack 33 

7.  German  charged  entanglements 38 

8.  Bicycle  units 40 

9.  German  methods  in  establishing  lines  of  defence 44 

10.  New  organization  of  the  German  infantry  company :..  45 

1 1 .  Notes  on  the  field  recruiting  depot 47 

12.  The  light  machine  guns  recently  put  into  service  in  the 

German  infantry 49 

13.  German  helmet  for  lookouts 50 

14.  Notes  on  light  infantry  trench  mortars  and  machine  guns. .  51 

(5) 


NOTES   ON   FORTIFICATION   SHELTERS   IN   THE 
POSITION  WARFARE  OF  THE  PRESENT  TIME. 

(WRITTEN  BY  A  FRENCH  GENERAL  STAFF  OFFICER,  JULY  12, 1917.) 


To  assist  in  the  study  of  ''Instruction  in  Field  Works"  of  December 
21,  1915. 

1.  The  first  duty  of  a  commander  is  to  reduce  losses  as  much  as 
possible.     It  is  therefore  necessary  to  construct-numerous  and  highly 
rcsi stive  shelters. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  necessary  that  a  body  of  troops  be  always 
ready  to  repel  an  attack,  and  not  be  surprised  in  its  bombardment 
shelters.  Hence,  the  depth  of  the  shelters,  and  consequently  their 
resisting  strength,  depends  on  the  position  they  occupy  in  the  de- 
fensive organization.  The  light  shelters  are  generally  improvised 
in  the  advance  lines.  The  bombproof s  are  systematically  con- 
structed farther  back. 

2.  Light  shelters. — The  first  position  comprises  a  series  of  succes- 
sive lines  formed  in  depth.     Except  at  certain  points  peculiarly 
important,  as,  for  example,  the  observing  stations,  it  is  conceded 
that  the  first  line  is  one  of  advance  posts,  occupied  only  by  lookouts. 
Indeed,  in  the  actual  procedure  of  attack  (in  force  or  by  surprise; 
the  attacker  is  always  certain  of  penetrating  the  first  hostile  line. 
Furnishing  it  with  defenders  consequently  allows  the  enemy  to  take 
prisoners  easily,  which  ia  often  the  object  of  local  attacks.     In  case 
of  a  local  attack,  the  first  line  is  evacuated  almost  completely,  and 
the  enemy  is  ousted  by  an  immediate  counter  attack.     In  case  of  a 
general  attack,  some  sacrifices  in  men  are  made  to  hold  the  first 
position.     Hence,  as  a  general  rule,  shelters  are  useless  and  even 
dangerous  in  the  line  of  lookouts,  since  they  tempt  the  lookouts  to 
take  refuge  in  them  under  bombardment,   and  consequently  to 
neglect  their  duty. 

To  the  rear  of  the  line  of  lookouts  is  the  real  line  of  resistance,  that 
which  should  be  occupied  in  case  of  attack.  In  ordinary  times  the 
garrison  of  this  line  occupies  shelters  located  to  the  rear— e.  g.,  on  a 
line  with  the  lateral  communication  trench,  if  there  is  one,  and  con- 
nected with  the  line  by  numerous  and  easily  accessible  communica- 
tion trenches. 

(7) 


8 

The  model  of  these  shelters  is  usually  that  of  the  dugout  shelter 
under  a  parapet  (fig.  7G  of  the  instruction  of  the  field  works),  proof 
against  "105's"  or  "ISO's." 

They  should  have  numerous  exits  and  the  criterion  of  good  arrange- 
ment of  these  shelters  is  the  speed  with  which  the  garrison  can  be 
brought  out  to  man  the  firing  parapet.  Means  of  protection  should 
be  taken  against  gas  (wet  cloths  to  close  the  shelters,  etc.). 

Care  must  be  taken  to  have  a  shelter  lookout  always  at  one  of  the 
entrances  to  give  the  alarm  in  case  of  attack.  This  is  a  general  rule 
for  all  troops  under  shelter.  In  most  cases  sufficient  protection  is 
secured  by  simple  trenches,  which  are  narrow  and  deep.  They  can 
be  used  when  it  is  desired  to  mass  troops  close  to  the  advance  line  in 
expectation  of  an  attack.  They  are  then  called  "places  of  arms." 

A  small  safety  garrison  is  usually  left  in  the  trench  itself.  This 
garrison  can  protect  itself  from  shrapnel  by  one  of  the  methods  indi- 
cated in  figures  60,  61,  62  of  the  same  instructions. 

Niches  in  the  walls  endanger  the  solidity  of  the  parapet  if  the 
earth  is  not  very  consistent.  Covered  trenches  prevent  the  com- 
batants from  going  over  the  parapet,  and  create,  if  used 'on  a  wide 
front,  a  dangerous  trap. 

Behind  the  line  of  resistance  is  the  line  of  supports.  On  the 
level  of  the  line  of  supports  the  local  reserves  are  held.  These  re- 
serves are  charged  with  reenforcing  the  garrison  of  the  line  of  resist- 
ance, or  with  making  a  counter  attack  to  recapture  this  line  if  it  has 
been  pierced  at  any  point. 

The  works  in  which  these  reserves  are  held  usually  come  under 
the  second  category  mentioned  in  paragraph  1  (bomb  proofs  system- 
atically constructed,  which  we  will  meet  with  again  in  the  second 
positions  and  the  positions  in  the  rear). 

3.  Bomb-proof  shelters. — The  form  of  these  works  depends  on  the 
terrain.  It  is  essential  to  provide  against  inundations  of  water. 
Whenever  the  nature  of  the  soil,  the  slope,  or  facilities  for  drainage 
allow,  the  mine  gallery  shelter  is  preferable,  as  it  is  the  most  solid, 
the  least  visible,  and  the  most  quickly  built. 

In  France,  special  battalions,  called  M.  D.  battalions  (Mascart 
Desolliers),  constnict  this  kind  of  work  very  rapidly  with  the  help 
of  improved  materiel. 

If  it  is  necessary  to  establish  shelters  above  the  ground,  one  should 
use  layers  of  logs,  reenforced  by  bursting  layers  or  slabs  of  cement. 
One  must  remember  that  in  this  type  (fig.  73)  the  sides  are  as  vul- 
nerable as  the  roof,  and  must  be  protected  in  the  same  way.  Actually, 
the  only  shelter  above  ground  that  provides  an  absolute  protection 


is  the  one  strengthened  with  concrete  (fig.  91),  but,  because  of  the 
slowness  and  cost  of  the  work,  it  should  generally  be  reserved  for 
the  important  parts  of  the  defense  (command  posts,  machine  gun 
blockhouses,  observing  stations,  telephonic  centers,  etc.). 

(a)  Important  command  posts  include  a  sufficiently  laige  number 
of  different  apartments  to  be  able  to  billet  all  additional  personnel — 
artillery  commander,  liaison  agents,  telegraphists,  signalers,  etc. 

They  are  usually  of  the  mine  gallery  type  (M.  D.).  It  is  important 
to  place  them  in  the  neighborhood  of  an  observing  station  and  a  com- 
munication route,  while  avoiding  locating  them  in  villages,  which 
are  points  highly  conspicuous  for  the  enemy's  artillery. 

(b)  The  machine  guns  are  placed  in  concrete  casemates  or  in  the 
open.     They  are  placed  in  concrete  casemates  when  they  are  to  fill 
a  peculiarly  important  checking  mission  in  a  given  direction  (en- 
filade fire  into  a  ravine,  flanking  fire  on  an  obstacle,  etc.).     In  this 
case  the  machine  gun  shoots  through  an  embrasure  and  the  casemate 
includes  room  for  the  gunners.     The  machine  guns  are  usually  found 
in  casemates  in  the  lines  of  supports  of  the  advance  position  and  in 
the  rear  positions,  because  time  and  a  certain  amount  of  tranquillity 
is  necessary  for  building  them. 

Frequently  machine  guns  are  placed  in  the  open,  either  in  the 
trench  or  even  forward  in  the  shell  craters.  The  gunners  then  have 
a  special  shelter,  connected  with  the  machine  gun  emplacement  by 
a  communication  trench  or  by  a  sap  corning  out  on  the  surface 
through  a  shaft. 

(c)  The  observing  stations,  by  reason  of  their  positions,  need  very 
thorough  protection.     As  a  rule  they  are  constructed  of  concrete. 
It  is  often  possible  to  construct  shelters  for  the  men  on  a  slope  hidden 
from  view,  and  to  cut  a  tunnel  having  a  loophole  on  the  enemy's  side. 

It  is  quite  evident  that,  whenever  possible,  natural  cover  of  the 
country  must  be  utilized.  In  many  places  use  is  made  of  former 
stone  quarries,  or  of  house  cellars.  In  the  latter  case,  the  vaulting 
is  reinforced  by  materials  from  the  demolition  of  near-by  houses. 
Both  quarries  and  cellars  make  excellent  shelters.  In  connecting 
one  shelter  with  another,  bomb-proof  communications  are  constructed 
to  facilitate  coming  and  going.  Each  cantonment  ought  to  have 
bombardment-proof  shelters  for  the  garrison,  either  in  the  cellars  or 
outside  the  village. 

It  is  very  important  to  hide  the  artificial  shelters  from  view.  To 
this  end,  they  must  be  carefully  concealed,  not  only  after  their  com- 
pletion, but  also  during  construction,  because  aerial  photographs 
infallibly  reveal  the  slightest  modifications  made  in  the  appearance 
5909°— 17 2 


10 

of  the  terrain.  The  works  are  disclosed  by  the  change  in  color  due 
to  the  overturned  earth,  by  the  tracks  made  by  a  constant  circula- 
tion over  the  same  routes,  and  by  the  traces  of  ditches  dug  for  the 
underground  telephone  lines,  which  are  visible  even  after  the 
ditches  have  been  filled  in. 

In  the  organization  of  all  parts  of  a  position,  the  construction  of 
shelters  comes  after  the  construction  of  obstacles  (wire  entangle- 
ments) and  flanking  works  (machine  guns),  but  before  the  deepening 
of  the  trenches. 

NOTE. — Upon  arriving  at  the  front,  the  American  Army  will  find  an  existing 
situation,  and  will  first  have  to  perfect  the  shelters.  But  later  on  it  will  have  to 
organize  an  entire  position.  These  indications  aim  at  a  clarification  of  the  French 
regulations,  which  are,  unfortunately,  rather  barren. 


GERMAN  LAND  MINES. 

DESCRIPTION    OF    MINES    AND    FIRING    APPARATUS,    ETC.,    EXTRACTED 
FROM   THE    "SPRENGVORSCHRIFT." 

Land  mines  are  employed  on  the  roads  likely  to  be  used  by  the 
enemy  during  an  advance;  on  probable  sites  for  batteries  and  parks; 
in  ground  defiladed  from  view  of  the  German  position;  in  combina- 
tion with  other  obstacles;  to  increase  the  difficxilties  of  hostile  recon- 
naissance and  destruction  of  obstacles;  and  particularly  in  front  of 
a  position  in  danger  of  assault.  Both  observation  and  contact  mines 
are  employ ed . 

Mines  are  marked  in  some  way  to  insure  that  German  troops  do 
not  march  over  them,  but  this  is  done  in  such  a  manner  that  the 
marks  are  not  likely  to  attract  the  attention  of  even  a  wide-awake 
enemy. 

(According  to  Belgian  accounts  mines  have  been  placed  in  build- 
ings, under  pavements,  and  even  in  soldiers'  graves,  with  the  corpses 
over  them.) 

OBSERVATION    MINES. 

These  are  fired  electrically.  They  can  not  therefore  be  very  far 
from  the  position  that  they  defend.  They  are  generally  to  be  found 
in  front  of  permanent  or  semipermanent  fortifications,  the  leads 
having  been  laid  during  the  construction  of  the  works.  They  are 
seldom  employed  in  field  works  on  account  of  the  great  length  of 
wire  required.  Observation  mines  are  laid  in  groups  of  3  or  more, 
each  group  in  continuous  circuit.  The  charges  used  and  the  depth 
at  which  they  are  placed  vary.  To  stop  an  assault  they  are  laid 
either  30  to  50  cm.  (12  to  20  inches)  under  the  surface,  so  that  the 
high  explosive  acts  direct  on  the  enemy,  or  1  to  2  meters  (3  feet  4 
inches  to  6  feet  8  inches)  deep,  so  that  masses  of  earth  are  thrown 
up.  The  effect  is  sometimes  increased  by  covering  the  mines  with 
stones  (see  fig.  1).  In  this  case  the  mines  in  a  group  may  be  from 
50  to  75  meters  (55  to  02  yards")  apart.  The  charges  are  so  calculated 
that  when  a  group  is  fired  only  a  shallow  trench  is  formed,  which 
gives  no  appreciable  cover  to  the  enemy. 

The  leads  are  buried  at  least  30  cm.  (12  inches)  under  ground  to 
avoid  damage,  and  those  of  different  groups  are  laid  2  meters  (6  feet 
8  inches)  apart  so  that  the  same  shell  can  not  disconnect  two  groups. 

(ID 


12 


The  firing  station  is  situated  so  as  to  secure  good  observation  of 
the  mine  field,  both  by  night  and  day.     It  is  provided  with  light- 

OBSERVATION  MINE. 


CONTACT  MINE. 
Top   View. 


.iri 


— cf 


Fig.  2. 


ball  pistols  and,  if  possible,  a  searchlight.     These  may  therefore 
give  a  clue  to  its  position. 


13 


CONTACT   MINES. 

Contact  mines,  if  used  in  large  numbers,  are  generally  laid  out 
in  mine  fields.     As  they  are  as  dangerous  to  German  troops  as  to  the 

CONTACT  MINE. 
UNDERSIDE  OF  LID. 


Fig.  3. 


Section  e/(tig.  2). 


5J    ^J&fett/Bo/t  JO 


Fig.  4. 

enemy's,  it  is  considered  desirable  that  they  should  be  kept  ready 
but  not  laid  until  shortly  before  they  are  wanted.  When  the  op- 
posing forces  are  very  close  to  each  other  the  mines  are  sometimes 


14 

used  singly  to  block  approaches  and  breaches,  and  in  ditches,  etc. 
They  are  often  laid  in  craters  made  by  shells. 

One  kind  of  contact  mine  is  fired  by  treading  on  it.  The  means 
of  firing  may  be  mechanical  or  electrical.  The  board  used  as  con- 
tact maker  is  about  40  cm.  (16  inches)  broad  and  from  40  cm.  to 
80  cm.  (16  to  32  inches)  long.  A  larger  surface  is  apt,  it  is  considered, 
to  betray  the  presence  of  the  mine  even  if  only  recently  laid.  About 
5  to  10  cm.  (2  to  4  inches)  of  earth  is  laid  on  the  contact  maker,  \vith 
a  piece  of  sailcloth  or  similar  material  under  to  prevent  the  soil 
getting  into  the  mine.  The  charge  is  from  4  to  22  Ibs.  of  high 
explosive. 

The  mechanical  contact  mine  is  made  in  the  form  of  a  wooden 
box  (see  figs.  2  to  6)  with  a  lid  fitting  loosely  inside  it.  One  end 
of  the  lid  is  pivoted;  the  other  is  prevented  Irom  falling  inwards 
by  two  loops  of  three  strands  of  copper  wire.  Each  loop  is  attached 
to  a  nail  or  screw  "n"  (fig.  5)  on  the  end  of  the  box  and  passes  round 
another  nail  "m"  on  the  underside  of  the  lid.  A  space  of  about  2 
to  4  inches  is  left  between  the  lid  and  the  end  of  the  box  so  that  the 
lid  can  fall  and  is  not  jambed  when  it  is  trodden  on  and  the  wire 
loops  are  broken. 

Two  mechanical  fuze  lighters  "r  r'!  with  fuze  leading  to  the  charge 
are  screwed  to  the  lid  (figs.  3  and  6).  A  description  of  the  lighter 
is  given  below.  The  firing  pins  are  attached  by  wire  to  a  screw  or 
nail  "o"  (Fig.  6)  on  the  end  of  the  box.  When  the  pins  are  drawn 
by  the  lid  dropping  the  fuze  lighters  are  set  in  action. 

A  safety  bolt  "p"  is  provided  which  is  withdrawn  aftef  the  mine 
has  been  laid. 

The  mechanical  fuze  lighter  is  shown  in  fig.  7  which  sufficiently 
explains  it.  It  is  made  fast  to  the  lid  by  a  clip  with  screw  fastenings. 

The  charges  are  made  up  to  the  required  weight  in  "cartridges," 
each  containing  1  k.g.  (2.2  Ibs.)  of  explosive.  The  "cartridges" 
consist  of  5  slabs,  each  wrapped  in  paraffined  paper,  and  inclosed 
in  a  tin  box  about  20  cm.  by  7  cm.  by  5  cm.  (8  in.  by  2.8  in.  by  2  in.) 
On  three  sides  of  the  box  (fig.  8)  will  be  found  a  hole  covered  with 
parchment  paper  for  insertion  of  the  fuze.  Wires  "w  w' '  are  soldered 
alongside  the  hole  to  secure  the  fuze. 

THE  ELECTRO  CONTACT  MINE 

is,  in  its  general  appearance  and  method  of  attaching  the  lid  of  the 
box,  similar  to  the  mechanical  one,  but  it  is  fired  by  means  of  an 
electric  fuze.  The  battery  is  buried  near  it.  When  the  lid  is 
trodden  on,  a  contact  is  made  between  metal  strips  attached  to  it 
and  to  the  body  of  the  box  (see  fig.  9). 


15 


CoNTAct  MINE. 
Section  cd  (fig.  2).  Section  ab.  (fig.  2). 

n  SO 


W//////M7M 


r 


I 
I 


Fig.  5.  Fig.  6. 

MECHANICAL  FUZE  LIGHTER. 


i... 


Fig.  7. 


16 


TRIP    WIRE    MIXES. 

These  mines  are  fired  by  the  enemy  cutting  or  disturbing  a  wire 
attached  to  them.  As  trip  wires  are  difficult  to  conceal  even  in 
long  grass,  this  type  of  mine  is  as  a  rule  used  only  close  in  front  of 
the  position  or  in.  or  in  front  of,  a  wire  entanglement.  If  used  at  a 

CARTRIDGE. 


3" 


Fig.  8. 


ELECTRO  CONTACT  MINE. 
Section. 


Pig.  9. 

greater  distance  they  are  placed  where  their  removal  can  be  hin- 
dered by  fire. 

A  special  mechanical  fuze  lighter  is  used  with  trip  wire  mines 
(see  Figs.  10  and  11),  but  the  fuze  lighter  already  described  can  also 
be  employed. 

The  mines  are  laid  as  shown  in  figs.  12  and  13.  In  the  former  two 
posts  are  driven  in  about  8  meters  (9  yards)  apart  and  connected  by  a 


17 


TRIP   WIRE    MINES. 
FUZE  LIGHTER. 


Side  View. 


Safety  fi'j 


SECTION. 


/re 


POWDER  CHAMBER 
(which  screws  on  to  Fig.  11). 


Striker 

Fig.  11. 


DETAIL  OF  STRIKER. 


18 


thin  wire  stretched  tight.  The  connecting  wire  of  the  fuze  lighter  is 
made  fast  to  this  wire;  the  other  end  of  lighter  is  nailed  to  the  top 
of  a  third  post  so  that  the  lighter  is  in  tension. 

TRIP  WIRE  MINES. 
First  Method. 


Fig.  12. 


Second  Method. 


Fig.  13. 

The  charge  is  buried  in  the  ground.  In  laying,  the  "powder 
chamber"  is  not  screwed  to  the  body  of  the  fuze  lighter  until  all 
arrangements  are  completed;  after  this  has  been  done  the  safety 
pin  is  removed,  from  a  safe  distance,  by  pulling  a  cord.  The  striker 


19 


acts  if  the  wire  is  cut  or  drawn  away  from  the  post  to  which  the  lighter 
is  fixed. 


TO 


K 
C5 


05 
W 
> 

Q 


bo 

E 


In  the  second  form  (fig.  13),  two  posts  are  placed  about  4  metera 
(4.4  yards)  apart;  the  fuze  lighter  is  nailed  on  one  post  and  attached 
by  a  wire  to  the  other. 


20 


DESTRUCTION    OF   LAND   MINES. 


The  following  remarks  may  be  useful  as  regards  the  search  for 
and  destruction  of  an  enemy's  land  mines.     Great  skill  and  care 


are  required.  Suspected  localities  should  first  of  all  be  studied 
with  good  field  glasses.  The  following  signs  should  be  looked  for: 
Freshly  turned  up  earth,  settlement  of  the  ground,  oval  marks  on 


21 

the  ground  after  rain,  patches  of  grass  that  stand  out  conspicuously, 
narrow  strips  where  the  earth  has  been  disturbed  which  may  mark 
where  leads  have  been  laid,  ends  of  wire,  cord,  and  canvas  sticking 
up,  numerous  foot  tracks  on  a  confined  space,  litter  of  materials  such 
as  powder,  guncotton,  shavings,  paper. 

If  no  signs  of  mines,  or  only  doubtful  ones,  can  be  observed, 
engineers  must  be  sent  to  creep  forward  and  reconnoiter.  For  this 
purpose  they  should  be  provided  with  wooden  mallets  and  probes. 
A  probe  is  a  thin  iron  rod  about  3  feet  long  and  provided  with  a 
handle.  If  a.  contact  mine  is  discovered,  it  should  be  marked  and 
destroyed  later  by  firing  a  slab  of  guncotton  on  top  of  it.  Trip-wire 
mines  can  be  destroyed  by  attaching  a  guncotton  primer  to  the  wire 
and  detonating  it,  or  by  firing  the  mine  by  means  of  a  long  cord 
made  fast  to  the  trip  wire.  When  the  leads  of  observation  mines 
are  discovered  they  should  be  cut  singly  and  the  ends  turned  up. 
Contact  mines  have  sometimes  been  exploded  by  driving  cattle  over 
them.  During  his  march  through  Georgia,  in  1865,  General  Sherman 
notified  the  enemy's  authorities  that  if  they  did  not  inform  him  of 
the  position  of  their  land  mines  he  would  be  compelled  to  march 
batches  of  prisoners  in  front  of  his  columns,  and  found  it  necessary 
to  carry  out  his  threat.  In  any  case  the  inhabitants  should  be 
questioned  as  regards  mines  in  roads  and  buildings. 

The  simplest  way  to  clear  suspected  localities,  for  instance  lanes 
left  through  obstacles,  is  by  firing  a  long  line  of  small  charges. 
Single  charges  of  100  Ibs.  of  high  explosive  are  effective  for  destroy- 
ing contact  mines  within  a  radius  of  38  yards  by  the  force  of  the 
explosion  alone,  but  they  are  useless  against  trip-wire  mines. 

The  artillery  can  give  much  assistance  in  preparing  the  way  for 
the  engineers. 

Figs.  14  and  15  represent  land  mines  reported  to  have  been  laid 
under  roads  in  Belgium.  No  reason  is  given  for  the  two  charges  in 
fig.  15  being  arranged  for  firing  in  series,  nor  is  it  clear  whether  they 
are  side  by  side  or  one  below  the  other.  The  actual  firing  arrange- 
ments are  no  doubt  similar  to  those  described  above. 


COMBAT  IN  WOODS. 

TRANSLATION  OF  A  GERMAN  DOCUMENT. 

The  chapter  on  combat  in  woods  should  be  particularly  empha- 
sized in  the  noncommissioned  officers'  course. 

General  considerations. — When  they  escape  the  enemy's  view, 
woods  form  important  supporting  points  or  flanking  positions,  and 
may  even  become  the  center  of  the  combat.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
seen  from  a  distance,  they  easily  draw  the  artillery  fire,  and  are 
therefore  unavailable  for  defilade  from  the  enemy's  sight,  even  if 
they  are  of  small  importance.  Woods  allow  small  effectives  to 
defend  themselves  against  a  larger  force,  and  favor  a  combat  de- 
signed to  gain  time.  They  aid  in  deceiving  the  enemy  as  to  the 
forces  before  him .  They  are  also  useful  when  we  wish  to  disengage 
from  the  combat  and  disappear.  When  our  troops  occupy  woods, 
the  enemy,  who  still  seeks  a  decision  outside  the  woods,  may  be 
forced  to  employ  a  large  force,  out  of  proportion  to  the  end  in  view. 

I.  Defense  of  woods  by  the  French. — The  French  like  outposts  and 
machine  guns  to  push  to  the  edge  of  a  wood,  where  they  construct 
a  wire  entanglement.    They  then  establish  defensive  works  in  the 
interior,   such  as  low  blockhouses,  connected  by  entanglements. 
The  obstacles  are  so  placed,  from  the  edge  to  the  interior  of  the  wood, 
that  the  enemy  will  be  led  intO'Cul-de-sacs  covered  by  machine  guns. 
Sharpshooters  and  machine  guns  in  the  trees  cover  the  roads  and 
paths.     They  make  great  use  of  sound  signals,  intended  to  warn  the 
defenders  in  time  of  the  enemy's  approach.     (In  the  Vosges,  Chas- 
seurs Alpines  hidden  in  the  trees  gave  the  alarm  to  the  garrison  by 
imitating  birds'  cries.)     The  defense  is  prepared  in  an  offensive 
manner  (prepared  ambushes),   and  above  all  with  the  object  of 
falling  on  the  enemy's  flank  when  it  advances  without  method. 

II.  Combat  on  the  edge  of  the  woods,  and  advance  into  the  icoods. — 
The  edge  of  the  woods  is  taken  like  any  other  position.     Only  in- 
sparse  woods  should  the  advance  be  made  rapidly  to  the  opposite 
edge  and  the  machine  guns  placed  there  in  position.     Infantry 
detachments  with  machine  guns  surround  the  woods.     The  difficulty 
arises  when  the  woods  are  large. 

(22) 


23 

Instructions:  Advance  for  about  50  meters  in  the  woods.  Place 
pursuing  patrols  in  advance  on  all  roads;  outside  the  wood,  have 
strong  combat  patrols  in  liaison  with  the  troops  on  the  roads  leading 
from  the  edges  to  the  interior. 

Mark  out  carefully  the  direction  of  the  march  (with  a  compass). 
Fix  the  leader's  position.  Assure  transmission  of  information. 
Bring  up  the  led  horses,  ammunition  wagons  and  combat  train. 

The  following  points  are  important  while  waiting  to  encounter  the 
enemy  in  the  woods: 

The  formation  of  the  troops  depends  on  the  density  of  the  woods. 
A  close  line  of  skirmishers  with  supports  following  closely  is  best 
suited  to  open  woods.  The  skirmishers  should  be  grouped  in  dense 
woods.  In  echelon  formation,  often  designated  by  the  name  "wood 
formation"  (waldformation),  has  shown  itself  effective  in  dense 
woods.  The  platoons  in  line  of  squad  columns,  the  front  files  act- 
ing as  scouts,  keep  near  enough  not  to  be  lost  sight  of.  The  buglers 
and  drummers  stay  in  rear  of  the  front  to  assure  the  liaison,  which 
is  much  more  useful  than  blowing  a  bugle  or  beating  a  drum.  The 
small  column  can  quickly  deploy  for  fire  and  easily  make  its  way 
through  the  woods.  Weapons  are  carried  in  the  hands.  Absolute 
silence  is  maintained.  The  advance  is  slow.  The  question  whether 
it  is  well  to  keep  the  troop  outside  the  woods  in  touch  with  the 
advance  by  means  of  illuminating  signals  should  be  studied.  The 
men  should  not  debouch  in  clearings  or  on  wide  roads  and  should 
not  leave  the  opposite  edge  without  taking  precautions.  Precau- 
tions must  be  taken  against  asphyxiating  shells. 

3.  Encounter  with  the  enemy  in  woods. — Note  the  importance  of 
the  surprise.     Allow  the  enemy  to  come  under  fire,  then  follow  the 
surprise  with  an  attack.     Choose  the  quickest  and  strongest  men  for 
lookouts.     Choose  their  positions  carefully.     Whenever  the  enemy 
is  repelled,  he  must  be  forced  back  vigorously  in  order  to  avoid  a 
return  offensive.     At  the  same  time  the  liaison  to  the  rear  and  to 
'the  flanks  must  be  kept  up.     Special  detachments  must  be  detailed 
to  clean  up  the  captured  position,  as  there  is  danger  of  receiving 
blows  from  the  rear  from  small  detachments  which  later  surrender. 

4.  Retreat  across  ivoods. — The  woods  make  it  easy  to  break  con- 
tact in  the  retreat.     An  able  defensive  may  be  maintained  by  a 
weak  rear  guard.     The  enemy's  overhasty  efforts  can  be  checked 
until  the  main  body  of  friendly  troops  are  safely  on  the  march  in 
the  desired  direction  or  are  in  a  position  to  make  a  counterattack. 
It  is  usually  easy  for  the  rear  guards  to  draw  the  enemy  in  a  desired 


24 

direction  favorable  to  the  counterattack.  It  is  well  to  be  abun- 
dantly supplied  with  machine  guns  in  order  to  economize  the 
infantry.  Protect  the  forced  retreat  and  the  taking  up  of  positions 
with  good  field  of  fire  by  means  of  shock  groups  armed  with  machine 
guns  and  using  the  inequalities  of  the  ground.  Retreat  by  rushes. 

5.  Combat  in  woods  in  position  warfare. — In  combat  of  long  dura- 
tion ia  woods  in  position  warfare  the  trees  disappear  little  by  little, 
and  the  field  of  view  is  disclosed.  At  the  beginning  of  an  action  in 
large  woods  the  artillery  is  not  very  effective ;  but  its  effectiveness 
increases  gradually,  particularly  in  combat  of  long  duration,  thanks 
to  the  use  of  technical  methods. 

When  attacking  well-defended  woods,  shock  groups  armed  with 
machine  guns,  light  trench  mortars,  and  flame  throwers  should  pre- 
cede the  assaulting  waves. 

The  trace  of  the  works,  the  entire  trench  system,  and  the  method 
of  occupation  of  the  enemy's  position  are  very  difficult  to  determine. 
Information  on  these  points,  as  well  as  on  the  flanking  works,  should 
be  obtained  by  reconnaissance  patrols  and  observation  from  the 
trenches  before  an  attack  is  carried  out.  Great  attention  is  paid  to 
the  organization  of  the  infantry  and  artillery  observation. 

The  sharpshooters  and  machine  guns  hidden  in  the  trees  should  be 
specially  watched.  These  should  be  rendered  harmless  by  spraying 
the  tops  of  the  trees  with  machine-gun  fire  before  the  main  body  of 
the  troops  enter  into  action. 

The  woods  offers  to  the  defense  the  essential  advantage  of  conceal- 
ing works  from  the  enemy,  and  even  from  the  aviators.  Methodical 
bombardment  of  these  works  by  the  artillery  is  very  difficult. 

A  wood  lends  itself  to  the  construction  of  surprise  works,  such  as 
machine-gun  blockhouses.  Counter  attacks  against  the  enemy,  who 
may  have  penetrated  the  line,  is  easy  for  the  defender  who  knows 
the  terrain. 

Abatis  do  not  form  good  obstacles.  They  dry  up  rapidly,  and 
enemy  patrols  and  artillery  fire  may  set  them  on  fire.  Bombard-' 
mcnts  inflict  great  damage  upon  them. 

Men  familiar  with  life  in  the  woods  should  be  chosen  for  the 
listening  posts — foresters,  hunters,  woodcutters,  etc.  It  is  possible, 
by  minutely  observing  the  motions  of  the  birds,  to  determine  the 
position  of  enemy  observing  stations  in  the  trees,  or  the  approach  of 
enemy  patrols.  The  flight  and  the  perch  of  the  birds  give  indica- 
tions of  the  enemy's  presence.  Birds  flying  toward  the  large  trees 
and  suddenly  startled  a  short  distance  from  them  may  betray  the 
presence  of  sharpshooters. 


25 

NOTE  ON  MONT  CORNILLET  TUNNEL. 

During  the  late  operations  on  the  French  front  the  Germans  have 
made  great  use  of  "tunnels,"  or  underground  shelters  of  great 
capacity,  to  permit  important  reserves  to  be  kept  as  near  the  front 
line  as  possible.  These  reserves  generally  escape  the  preparatory 
fire  and  are  ready  to  carry  out  strong  counterattacks  on  the  enemy 
who  is  assaulting  the  first  lines. 

Iii  this  connection  may  be  noted  the  cases  of  the  old  Didier  Mill, 
east  of  Filain,  accessible  to  wagona  and  capable  of  holding  three 
companies;  the  quarries  north  of  Colligis,  which  can  hold  3,000 
men;  the  Kohlershole,  west  of  Froidemont,  where  two  battalions 
were  sheltered  before  the  attack  on  May  18;  the  Brimont  gallery, 
capable  of  holding  a  battalion;  the  underground  galleries  on  Hill 
108,  etc. 

The  Cornillet  Tunnel. — A  similar  tunnel,  located  in  the  Cornillet 
Hill,  played  an  important  part  in  the  April-May  operations  in 
Champagne,  and  while  it  presented  the  advantages  of  this  type  of 
work,  it  also  showed  their  disadvantages. 

The  Cornillet  was  of  great  importance  to  the  Germans  as  an  ob- 
serving station  and  supporting  point.  A  line  of  trenches  behind 
wire  entanglements  surrounded  the  summit.  The  trenches  offered 
little  shelter,  but  a  tunnel  with  three  entrances  on  the  northern 
slopes  afforded  shelter  for  important  reserves. 

Its  construction. — The  tunnel  contained  three  galleries,  each  about 
300  meters  long  and  2  to  3  meters  wide,  cased  with  timber  on  the 
inside.  The  galleries  were  united  by  a  transverse  corridor  about 
50  meters  from  the  entrances.  The  entrances,  one  to  each  gallery, 
are  north  of  Cornillet  and  south  of  the  edge  of  Wood  B-47.  The 
principal  entrance  is  that  of  the  central  gallery,  at  the  end  of  a  path 
coming  from"  Nauroy.  Ventilation  was  effected  by  several  chim- 
neys, aided  by  hand  ventilators.  The  tunnel  was  capable  of  hold- 
ing 3  battalions  (one  to  each  gallery),  10  days'  reserve  rations,  and 
a  large  amount  of  munitions  of  all  descriptions.  Supply  service 
was  made  at  night  by  the  transport  troops  at  Beine,  where  the 
wagons  stopped.  Between  the  entrances  of  the  tunnel  and  the 
summit  of  Cornillet,  a  line  of  strongly  constructed  shelters  was 
established  for  the  machine  gunners  and  the  grenadiers. 

Its  part  in  the  attacks  of  April  17  and  May  4. — At  the  time  of  the 
attacks  of  April  17  and  May  4,  our  destructive  fire  was  unable  to 
do  any  permanent  damage  to  the  tunnel,  and  the  garrison  suc- 
cessfully repaired  the  damage  to  the  entrances.  The  garrison 
5969°— 17 1 


26 

remained  fresh,  and  carried  out  several  counterattacks  with  success, 
aided  by  the  resistance  of  several  groups  of  defenders  on  the  outside 
which  were  amply  provided  with  light  machine  guns. 

Its  part  in  the  attack  on  May  20. — On  the  night  of  May  19-20, 
fire  with  special  shells  on  the  entrance  overcame  the  pioneers  and 
prevented  them  from  repairing  the  damage.  On  the  morning  of 
the  20th  fire  with  400  cm .  shells  was  used  on  the  tunnel,  doing  great 
damage.  One  shell,  penetrating  hy  a  ventilating  shaft,  overthrew 
the  intersection  of  the  transverse  gallery,  crushed  the  room  con- 
taining the  two  battalion  commanders,  killing  one  and  mortally 
wounding  the  other.  A  part  of  the  garrison  was  asphyxiated,  and 
the  remainder  demoralized.  The  stopped-up  exits  could  not 
be  excavated. 

The  garrison,  comprising  the  2  battalion  commanders,  their 
adjutants,  their  liaison  personnel,  several  artillery  officers,  6  infantry 
companies,  the  elements  of  two  machine-gun  companies,  4  pioneer 
platoons,  1  dressing  station,  1  detachment  of  earth  conduction 
telegraphy,  were  grouped  less  than  500  meters  from  the  first  line, 
and  had  no  chance  to  intervene  after  the  assailant  had  passed  the 
first  line. 

Our  attack,  following  the  barrage  fire  step  by  step,  reached  the 
outlets  of  the  tunnel  before  the  defenders  noticed  it  and  no  troops 
could  leave  the  tunnel. 

Conclusion. — To  sum  up:  The  Cornillet  Tunnel  effectively  shel- 
tered a  very  strong  garrison  as  long  as  it  was  not  subjected  to  a  heavy 
bombardment.  But  from  the  time  our  large  calibers  reached  it 
effectively,  and  its  defenders  were  prevented  from  repairing  the 
damage  inflicted  on  its  few  outlets,  which  its  proximity  to  the  first 
line  rendered  inevitable,  one  single  round  shut  in  this  important 
command  and  made  it  unavailable. 


TACTICAL  PRINCIPLES  IN  DEFENSIVE  COMBAT, 
POSITION  WARFARE. 

[Translation  of  an  official  German  document  of  March,  1917,  captured  by  the 
French-] 

EDITED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE,  JULY,  1917. 

1.  INFANTRY. 

Energetic  measures  are  taken  to  see  that  the  infantry  on  the  line 
continues  its  work  on  its  positions,  even  during  combat.  All  in- 
fantry officers  and  officers  of  higher  rank  make  certain  of  this  by 
personal  inspections. 

At  night,  and  particularly  in  foggy  weather,  it  is  often  necessary  t 
to  reinforce  the  first-line  garrison  or  to  bring  up  the  reserves  nearer 
to  the  first  line.  In  foggy  weather  a  special  form  of  alarm  should  be 
arranged. 

The  shell  holes  between  the  defensive  works  are  a  source  of  danger. 
They  should  be  filled  up  by  fire  from  the  rear  and  flanks  and  watched 
by  the  infantry  and  artillery.  At  night  in  foggy  weather  they  should 
be  guarded  by  advance  posts. 

When  the  reserves  are  in  position,  it  is  essential  that  they  be  kept 
hidden  and  be  divided  skillfully  on  the  terrain  to  avoid  all  un- 
necessary losses.  Avoid  isolated  farms,  small  woods,  dales,  and 
depressions,  as  experience  shows  that  these  are  always  violently 
bombarded. 

When  the  action  is  on  exposed  ground  or  in  positions  that  offer 
little  shelter,  the  first  line  must  be  held  by  small  detachments,  while 
the  rest  of  the  troops  are  echeloned  in  great  depth,  as  if  in  a  thor- 
oughly fortified  position. 

When  an  enemy  attack  commences  with  a  long  and  intense  prepa- 
ration by  large  and  v  ery  large  caliber  artillery  and  by  trench  mortars, 
the  first  trenches  are  rapidly  changed  into  shell-hole  positions,  in 
which  groups  of  riflemen,  composed  of  isolated  squads,  form  around 
the  lookout  posts  and  the  shelters,  wherever  these  still  exist. 

It  is  essential  that  the  men  be  trained  to  join  these  points  together 
and  to  unite  them  to  the  trenches  in  the  rear,  taking  advantage  of 
lulls  in  the  combat,  of  night,  or  fog. 

The  influence  of  the  company  commanders  and  the  platoon  leaders 
during  combat  in  shell-hole  positions  is  felt  only  by  those  men  who 

(27) 


28 

surround  them.  In  these  circumstances,  courageous  men  with  iron 
nerves  become  the  backbone  of  the  combat.  Nevertheless,  the 
leaders  on  the  first  line,  superior  officers,  or  subalterns,  by  their  calm 
attitude  and  their  example,  should  seek  to  keep  their  men  in  a  state 
in  which  they  can  resist  or  counterattack  rapidly. 

It  is  not  necessary  in  combat  of  this  nature  to  reinforce  the  first- 
line  garrison  nor  to  send  up  reinforcements  continually.  The  gar- 
rison suffers  increasing  and  repeated  losses,  wMch,  being  useless, 
undermines  the  morale  of  the  troops.  The  more  advanced  positions 
can  not  be  held  simply  by  a  rigid  defense,  combined  with  reinforcing 
the  first-line  garrison.  To  obtain  this  result,  tactics  of  a  different 
nature  are  required. 

The  number  of  men  holding  the  first  line  should  not  be  large,  and 
the  men  should  not  be  rigidly  held  in  a  position  in  which  they  can 
no  longer  find  shelter,  but  should,  within  certain  limitations,  change 
their  position  to  escape  an  intense  bombardment.  Experience 
shows  that,  no  matter  how  carefully  the  enemy  directs  his  fire,  there 
are  portions  of  each  sector  assigned  to  a  unit  where  the  fire  is  less 
effective.  The  point  of  fall  of  enemy  projectiles  should  be  observed, 
and  one  should  avoid  the  more  intense  fire  by  advancing,  by  drawing 
off  to  one  side,  or  by  falling  back  on  the  nearest  supporting  lines. 
The  best  method  is  to  advance,  as  that  is  the  quickest  way  to  avoid 
the  enemy's  fire.  In  movements  toward  the  flanks,  or  toward  the 
nearest  supporting  trench  in  rear,  there  is  some  danger  that  the  con- 
tinuity of  the  firing  line  will  be  broken,  and  that  the  enemy  will 
establish  small  outposts  without  being  noticed.  The  detachments 
in  the  shell  holes  should  not  therefore  lose  sight  of  each  other,  and 
the  first  line  should  constantly  be  watched  from  the  rear. 

If  the  enemy  infantry  leaves  the  trench  to  attack  our  lines  each 
infantry  soldier  should  remember  that  the  surest  means  of  repelling 
an  attack  are  his  rifle,  hand  grenades,  and  bayonet,  and  that  even 
a  few  machine  guns  are  sufficient  to  break  up  an  attack.  The  use  of 
artillery  barrage  to  throw  back  an  attack  is  of  great  value,  but  is  not 
of  itself  sufficient  to  repel  violent  attacks. 

All  rifles  and  machine  guns  that  can  operate  effectively,  whether 
on  the  firing  line  or  on  the  defensive  positions  in  the  rear,  should  be 
trained  on  the  enemy's  attack.  In  addition,  destructive  fire  and 
artillery  barrage,  trench  mortars,  and  grenade  mortars  also  take  part. 

If,  in  spite  of  this,  the  enemy  manages  to  penetrate  into  our 
trenches,  the  artillery's  task  is  to  cut  off  the  attacking  waves  and 
reserves  that  follow  by  barrage  and  annihilating  fire,  while  enfilading 


29 

and  frontal  fire  (rifles,  automatic  rifles,  and  machine  guns)  is  directed 
at  the  enemy  infantry  who  have  penetrated  into  our  trench  to  pre- 
vent their  advance.  Trench  and  grenade  mortars,  especially,  should 
be  used  against  the  enemy  while  he  is  taking  up  the  position.  The 
artillery  also  takes  part,  provided  that  observation  can  be  secured. 

The  difficult  situation  in  which  the  enemy  is  now  found  should  be 
followed  up  without  waiting  for  further  orders.  The  detachments 
from  the  trench  garrison  retiring  on  the  flanks  and  rear,  as  well  as  the 
supports  who  are  held  behind  the  first  line  and  whose  r6le  must  be  as 
second  nature  to  them,  should  promptly  counterattack  and  retake 
the  first  line.  They  must,  in  certain  cases,  fall  under  the  enemy's 
artillery  fire.  In  hand-to-hand  combat  the  enemy  must  be  destroyed 
to  the  last  man  by  hand  grenades  and  bayonets.  An  essential  con- 
dition of  success  in  these  tactics  is  to  establish  observation,  by  the 
infantry,  of  the  terrain  which  extends  in  front  of  the  trenches  and 
between  the  lines. 

The  security  posts  do  not  take  part  in  these  counter  attacks. 

If  the  counter  attack  is  successful,  the  first  line  should  imme- 
diately be  put  in  a  state  of  defense,  but  the  garrison  of  the  trench 
should  be  reduced  to  its  original  number.  In  this  way,  the  action 
does  not  take  place  in  the  first  line,  but  for  the  first  line  and  around  it. 

It  is  essential  that  the  men  be  thoroughly  trained  in  these  tactics, 
and  that  the  subordinate  officers  receive  precise,  clear,  and  detailed 
instructions  as  to  what  they  are  to  do,  and  when  and  where  they  are 
to  do  it.  The  greatest  effort  each  man  is  capable  of  should  be  de- 
manded of  those  taking  part  in  the  attack. 

If  the  troops  who  are  in  the  advance  area  of  the  attack  can  not 
throw  back  the  enemy  or  hold  him,  a  combined  attack  of  general 
reserves  should  be  made  while  the  enemy  is  still  occupied  with  pre- 
paring the  defense  of  an  unfamiliar  trench  system  and  fighting  with 
local  reserves  for  the  possession  of  supporting  points,  etc.  Each  man 
who  fights  in  the  advance  zone  should  clearly  understand  that,  by 
holding  on,  even  if  completely  surrounded,  he  is  making  easier  the 
counter  attack,  which  will  surely  be  carried  out,  and  that  he  is  thus 
contributing  to  his  own  rescue.  He  must  therefore  fight  as  long  as 
he  can  make  use  of  his  weapons. 

The  attack  itself  should  be  carried  out  in  light  waves,  attacking 
detachments  being  used  on,  isolated  points.  The  attack  should  be 
supported  by  the  fire  of  machine  guns  echeloned  in  advance,  by 
grenade  mortars  and  trench  mortars,  by  infantry  guns,  and  by  the 
artillery  situated  more  in  the  rear.  The  success  of  these  attacks  de- 


30 

pends,  not  on  the  strength  engaged,  but  on  the  energy  of  will,  the 
cooperation  of  all  means  of  combat,  and  the  rapidity  of  execution. 

A  decisive  factor  of  success  is  the  choice  of  a  propitious  moment 
for  the  throwing  in  of  the  reserves.  Experience  shows,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  demands  for  reinforcements  sent  by  the  first  line  are  often 
not  justified,  or  are  premature.  If  the  reserves  are  brought  up  too 
soon,  their  combative  force  is  dissipated  and  the  junior  chiefs  are 
forced  to  crowd  their  lines  with  too  many  men. 

If  an  immediate  attack  does  not  drive  off  or  annihilate  the  enemy 
•who  has  succeeded  in  penetrating  the  position,  the  latter  can  only 
be  retaken  by  a  methodical  attack. 

Relief. — Frequent  relief  of  the  infantry  is  not  desirable,  either 
from  the  commander's  or  the  troops'  point  of  view.  Changes  prevent 
the  troops  from  familiarizing  themselves  with  the  position  and  di- 
minishes their  interest  in  improving  it. 

Experience  shows  that  confusion  often  occurs  during  the  relief 
and  that  small  portions  of  terrain  are  lost. 

Precautions  must  be  taken  beforehand,  in  the  case  of  approaches 
discovered  by  the  enemy  and  blocked  by  his  fire,  to  replace  them  by 
other  well-known  and  clearly-established  communications. 

2.  ARTILLERY. 

Fire  on  zones  (if  not  confined  to  narrow  limits  by  means  of  registra- 
tion points  near  the  target,  coordinated  by  data  obtained  from  an 
accurate  map)  and  surprise  fire  with  explosive  shells  against  enemy 
artillery  groups  are  useless,  as  a  rule.  On  the  other  hand,  zone  fire 
with  gas  shells  may  be  very  useful  to  paralyze  the  artillery  tempo- 
rarily. Gas  shells  are  not  used  by  counter  batteries  which  seek  to 
destroy  an  enemy  battery. 

"When  the  trenches  are  separated  by  an  average  distance  (150  to 
200  meters),  barrage  fire  must  fall  on  and  dose  in  front  of  the  first 
enemy  trench,  for  otherwise  the  security  of  our  own  trench  garrison, 
which  must  not  be  compromised  under  any  circumstances,  is  not 
guaranteed.  If  the  enemy  jumping-off  trenches  are  so  near  our  own 
lines  that  barrage  fire  may  inflict  damage  on  our  o\vn  troops,  bombard- 
ment of  the  jumping-off  trenches  should  be  left  to  the  trench  mortars, 
grenade  mortars,  and  infantry.  The  artillery  barrage  fire  should  then 
be  directed  against  the  enemy's  rear  trenches,  so  as  to  cut  off  his 
first  attacking  waves  from  their  supports,  and  strike  the  latter  while 
they  are  concentrating.  If  the  enemy's  first  line  trenches  are  more 
distant  from  our  lines  (more  than  300  meters),  the  barrage  fire  should 
adapt  itself  to  the  progress  of  the  enemy's  attack. 


31 

Artillery  action  against  the  enemy  tanks  is  of  great  importance  in 
repelling  attacks  because  of  the  novelty  of  the  engines  and  the 
lack  of  experience  in  regard  to  them. 

Destructive  and  barrage  fire  directed  against  depressions,  roads, 
and  enemy  positions  will  often  halt  the  tanks  by  the  density  of  fire, 
so  that  only  a  few  can  reach  or  penetrate  our  lines. 

Infantry  guns  and  close-combat  guns  with  direct  fire  and  short 
range  are  used  against  tanks.  These  guns  are  furnished  with  a  special 
projectile  for  this  purpose.  It  is  important  that  fire  should  not  be 
opened  too  soon,  so  that  the  positions  of  the  guns  will  not  be  located, 
and  so  that  they  will  still  be  on  hand  when  needed. 

Batteries  of  heavy  howitzers  are  also  used  to  attack  the  tanks. 
They  have  special  sectors  assigned  to  them— as  a  rule,  strips  of 
ground  near  and  in  front  of  our  lines,  which  they  can  observe  well, 
and  on  which  they  can  get  the  range  for  their  fire  in  periods  of  calm. 
If  a  tank  penetrates  into  a  zone  to  which  a  battery  is  assigned,  all 
its  guns  are  turned  on  the  tank,  and  volleys  are  fired  until  the  tank 
has  been  put  out  of  action. 

Only  a  bombardment  carefully  organized  in  this  way  will  be  suc- 
cessful against  the  tanks.  General  orders  under  which  all  the  bat- 
teries which  see  the  tanks  approach  are  to  open  fire  result  only  in 
confusion  and  checks. 

In  rare  instances  heavy  guns  with  a  flat  trajectory,  firing  direct 
fire  and  with  direct  observation,  can  be  effective  if  the  tanks  have 
penetrated  the  lines. 

Division  of  the  artillery. — The  artillery  assigned  to  the  armies  to 
reenforce  them  in  a  defensive  battle  should  be  distributed  between 
the  divisions  according  to  the  importance  of  their  respective  sectors. 
Artillery  should  not  be  massed.  Distribution  in  depth  forces  the 
enemy  to  scatter  his  fire. 

3.  AERONAUTICS  (INCLUDING  ANTIAIRCRAFT  DEFENSE). 

It  is  advisable  to  increase  considerably  the  aeronautics  (recon- 
naissance and  artillery  planes,  monoplane  battle  planes,  captive 
balloons,  and  antiaircraft  guns)  before  the  defensive  battle  begins, 
for  the  enemy's  first  object  is  to  secure  complete  mastery  of  the  air. 
This  must  be  prevented  as  soon  as  possible. 

When  the  situation  is  clear,  and  the  decision  to  impede  the  enemy 
is  made,  the  reenforcement  of  the  menaced  front  is  ordered.  The 
aerial  forces  and  the  antiaircraft  defenses  are  considerably  increased. 
Aeroplanes,  balloons,  and  antiaircraft  guns  should  be  withdrawn 
without  hesitation  from  less  important  fronts. 


32 

4.  PIONEERS. 

(«)  The  pioneers  should  never  be  employed  on  any  works  that  the 
infantry  can  carry  out. 

(b)  The  divisional  chief  of  engineers  also  commands  the  divisional 
pioneer  battalion.     The  pioneer  and  trench  mortar  companies,  the 
divisional  searchlight  platoon,  and.  as  a  rule,  the  working  companies 
are  under  his  orders.     The  general  commanding  the  division  regu- 
lates the  assignment  and  disposition  of  the  pioneer  and  trench  mor- 
tar companies,  as  well  as  the  searchlight  units  which  are  temporarily 
attached  to  the  division. 

(c)  Defensive  action  also  gives  the  trench  mortars  the  special  role 
of  attacking  the  tanks.    As  in  the  case  of  the  heavy  artillery,  special 
zones  in  front  of  our  lines  which  can  be  accurately  observed  are  as- 
signed to  the  heavy  and  medium  trench  mortars.     If  the  tanks  enter 
the  zones,  the  designated  trench  mortars  turn  their  fire  from  all  other 
targets  and  direct  it  on  the  tanks. 


INFORMATION  ON  THE  SECOND  ARMY. 


METHODS  OF  GERMAN  INFANTRY  ATTACK. 

In  all  the  combined  operations  that  took  place  in  the  region  of 
Verdun  from  February  21  to  April  15  the  Germany  Army  corps  engaged 
by  division,  side  by  side,  except  when  the  width  or  the  importance 
of  the  zone  of  action  assigned  to  an  army  corps  only  called  for  the 
engagement  of  one  division,  the  other  division  resting  in  the  rear 
ready  to  relieve  the  division  extended  on  the  first  line. 

Example:  Seventh  Reserve  Corps,  in  the  zone  between  the  Meuse 
and  the  Bois  d'Haumont  line  (inclusive) — Bois  de  Caures  (exclu- 
sive)— Louvemont,  February  28  to  April  25. 

I.  ZONE  OF  ACTION  AND  DISPOSITION  OF  THE  DIVISION. 

The  zone  of  action  of  a  division  of  three  regiments  (7,200  rifles) 
varies  in  width  from  1,000  to  2,500  meters,  according  to  the  impor- 
tance and  the  number  of  successive  objectives  which  are  presented. 

The  following  examples  and  their  interpretation  are  taken  from 
sketches  and  data  made  from  the  enemy  battle  map  and  completed 
by  data  furnished  by  captured  officers. 

Example:  (1)  April  11,  the  Twenty -first  Infantry  Division  set  out 
on  a  front  of  attack  of  about  1,000  meters,  Fort  de  Douamont  (ex- 
clusive)— south  branch  of  the  ravine  of  the  Fausse  Cote — to  attack 
in  the  general  direction  of  Verdun.  The  zone  of  action  had  an 
average  width  of  800  to  1,000  meters;  western  limit,  hill  320 — hill 
261 — point  west  of  woods  west  of  Fort  St.  Michel;  eastern  limit, 
Vaux  Road  to  Hill  St.  Michel;  successive  objectives,  Bois  de  Cail- 
lette,  Fleury  devant  Douamont,  Fort  St.  Michel. 

(2)  March  6,  the  Twenty-second  Reserve  Division  formed  for 
attack  on  front  of  about  2,500  meters  from  Forges  Brook  (500  meters 
in  front  of  Forges)  up  to  the  Meuse.  The  zone  of  action  had  an 
average  width  of  2,000  to  3,000  meters;  western  limit,  500  meters  to 
north  of  Forges — point  west  of  Bois  de  Corbeaux;  eastern  limit,  rail- 
road Forges-Cumieres;  objective,  Bois  de  Corbeaux — Bois  de  Cu- 
mieres — hill  265  (east  of  Bois  de  Cumieres). 

The  first  example  corresponds  to  a  long-range  action  (zone  of 
action  narrow,  successive  objectives) .  The  Twenty-first  Infantry  Di- 

(33) 


34 

vision  engaged  its  two  regiments  side  by  side  on  the  first  line — Eighty- 
seventh  to  right,  Eighty-first  to  left — holding  the  Eightieth  in  reserve 
near  Bezonvaux.  The  second  example  corresponds  to  a  limited  range 
action  (zone  of  action  large,  single  objective).  The  Twenty-second 
Reserve  Division  attacksed  its  three  regiments  side  by  side  on  the 
first  line.  In  both  cases  the  density  of  the  front  attack  remained 
about  the  same.  The  front  of  attack  of  a  regiment  varied  from  500 
to  800  meters. 

II.  DISPOSITION  OF  REGIMENT  IN  ATTACK. 

\Yhatever  the  division's  disposition,  the  regiment  as  a  rule  is 
formed  in  depth  by  successive  battalions,  in  the  following  order: 

One  battalion  for  attack. 

Two  battalions  in  reserve,  echeloned  in  depth  at  distances  van-ing 
according  to  the  terrain,  the  nearest  ready  to  intervene  to  reenforce 
the  attack  on  the  first  objective  or  to  make  a  new  attack  beyond  this 
objective,  the  farthest  often  resting,  in  this  case  destined  to  come 
to  the  relief  of  exhausted  units. 

Examples: 

1st.  Disposition  of  Eighty-first  Infantry  (Twenty-first  Division), 
April  11.  Second  Battalion — Battalion  of  attack  in  the  jumping-off 
trenches,  east  part  of  Bois  de  la  Caillette.  First  and  Third  Battalions 
in  reserve  in  the  ravine  of  the  Fausse  Cote. 

N.  B. — These  two  battalions  were  first  echeloned  inside  the  Bois 
d'Hardaumont,  exposed  to  our  artillery  fire  and  separated  from  the 
first  line  by  an  exposed  space,  difficult  to  cross.  They  were  even- 
tually pushed  into  the  dead  angle  of  the  ravine  of  the  Fausse  Cote. 

2d.  Disposition  of  Eighty-seventh  Infantry  (Twenty-first  Divi- 
sion), April  11.  Third  Battalion — Battalion  of  attack,  jumping-off 
trench,  west  part  of  Bois  de  la  Caillette. 

First  Battalion,  Reserve — 'Extremity  west  from  west  branch  of 
ravine  of  the  Fausse  Cote. 

Second  Battalion,  Reserve — Quarries  west  of  Bois  d'Hardaumont. 

3d.  Distribution  of  Eighty-second  Reserve  Infantry  (Twenty- 
second  Reserve  Division),  March  6 — 

Second  Battalion,  battalion  of  attack — When  this  battalion 
reaches  the  first  crest  southeast  of  Forges,  the  two  other  battalions 
still  remain — one  established  along  the  Forges  Brook  east  of  the 
village,  the  other  resting  at  Bois  de  Forges. 

4th.  Distribution  of  the  Fifty-sixth  Reserve  Infantry  and  Sev- 
enth Reserve  Infantry  (One  hundred  and  twenty-first  Infantry 
Division),  March  31,  at  the  time  of  the  attack  on  Vaux — • 


35 

A.  Fifty-sixth  Reserve  Infantry. 

.  Third  Battalion,  battalion  of  attack,  in  the  jumping-off  trench, 
north  of  the  Vaux  railroad. 

One  battalion  in  reserve,  near  the  south  point  of  the  Bois 
d'Hardaumont,  ready  to  reenforce  or  counterattack. 

One  battalion  in  reserve  at  Bezonvaux  Works. 

B.  Seventh  Reserve  Infantry. 

Third  Battalion,  battalion  of  attack,  in  the  jumping-off  trench, 
south  of  the  Vaux  railroad. 

First  Battalion,  in  reserve,  east  of  Vaux  village. 

Second  Battalion,  rest  camp  at  Loison,  20  kilometers  from  Vaux. 

UI.  DISPOSITION  AND  METHOD  OF  BATTALION  ATTACK. 

Disposition. — The  infantry  battalion  is  nearly  always  placed  on 
two  attacking  lines. 

The  first  attacking  line  is  generally  formed  by  two  companies, 
side  by  side,  deployed  in  the  jumping-off  trench  or  the  last  shelter 
from  which  the  attack  is  launched . 

The  second  line  is  held  in  the  supporting  trench,  the  shelters, 
or  behind  a  crest. 

METHOD    OF   ASSAULT — WAVES. 

Principles. — The  principles  which  follow  (the  third  in  particular) 
are  given  from  explicit  statements  of  captured  officers: 

1.  Each  attacking  line  is  always  given  an  objective,  definitely 
and  exactly  limited  (width  equal  to  attacking  front,  depth  usually 
no  more  than  two  successive  trenches). 

2.  The  assault  is  not  launched  until  the  artillery  has  completely 
overthrown  the  trenches,  destroyed  the  obstacles,  and  prevented 
the  defenders  from  using  their  arms. 

3.  The  assault  itself  is  preceded  by  reconnaissances  on  the  objec- 
tive, whose  mission  is  to  verify  whether  the  artillery  has  obtained 
the  desired  results.     These  reconnaissances  form  the  first  assaulting 
wave.    The  others  do  not  go  forward   unless  the  first  advances. 
What  have  often  been  taken  to  be  simple  reconnaissances  destined 
to  get  an  idea  of  our  lines  have  in  reality  been  the  beginnings  of 
attacks  which  we  have  checked. 

Carrying  out  an  assault. — The  attacking  line  debouches  by  several 
successive  waves.  The  different  methods  observed  resemble  the, 
following  types: 

Three  successive  waves  at  distances  of  20  or  30  paces, 


36 

First  wave:  Reconnaissance;  1  or  2  squads  to  a  platoon,  accom- 
panied by  several  pioneers  and  grenadiers — deployed  as  skirmishers 
at  very  wide  intervals. 

Second  wave:  Dense  line  of  skirmishers  formed  by  main  body  of 
each  platoon.  It  takes  possession  of  the  trenches. 

Third  wave:  Containing  the  balance  of  each  platoon.  It  is  an 
echelon,  which  makes  good  the  casualties  and  brings  up  reinforce- 
ment of  munitions  and  material  (tools,  sandbags,  etc.),  allowing 
the  captured  trenches  to  be  turned. 

ROLE    OF    SECOND    ATTACKING    LINE. 

This  line  is  reserved  principally  for  a  second  assault  beyond  the 
objective  captured  by  the  first  line. 

In  exceptional  cases  they  reenforce  the  first  line  of  attack  or  a 
retreat  from  an  unsuccessful  attack. 

NOTE.— The  assaulting  waves  are  always  deployed.  The  prisoners  are  unani- 
mous in  stating  that  they  have  never  seen  columns  of  assault  used.  The  impression 
of  small  columns  following  up  the  first  wave  is  given  by  stragglers  swarming  behind 
the  two  waves  that  debouch  in  dense  lines. 

Example: — 

1.  Attack  of  the  Second  Battalion,  Eighty-second  Reserve  In- 
fantry, April  9,  northwest  of  Cumieres.    This  battalion  debouched 
from  Bois  de  Cumieres  April  9  at  12  o'clock  to  attack  the  French 
trenches  northwest  of  Cumieres. 

First  attacking  line — Eighth  and  Seventh  Companies  side  by  side 
and  deployed  in  the  trenches  on  the  south  edge  of  the  Boise  de 
Cumieres. 

First  wave — 20  men  to  a  platoon,  commanded  by  an  officer.  The 
20  men  of  the  Eighth  Company  reached  in  a  single  rush  the  first 
French  trench,  which  had  remained  nearly  intact.  They  cut  a 
passage  with  wire  cutters  through  the  wire  entanglements,  and  threw 
themselves  in  a  bound  over  our  first  trench  toward  the  supporting 
trench,  where  they  were  taken  prisoners  or  killed. 

In  view  of  the  failure  of  the  first  wave,  the  second  wave  debouched 
half  heartedly.  Our  barrage  fire  drove  them  back  to  the  Bois  de 
Cumieres. 

2.  Attack  of  the  Second  Bavarian  Division,  March  20,  on  the  Bois 
d'Auvergne. 

Disposition  of  First  Battalion  of  the  Twenty-second  Bavarians  : 
First  line  of  attack,  Companies  One  and  Four. 
First  wave,  8  to  10  men  to  a  platoon,  and  15  to  20  pioneers,  an 
officer  commanding  the  whole. 


37 

Second  wave,  20  men  of  the  platoon. 
Third  wave,  the  rest  of  the  platoon. 

3.  Attack  on  the   First  Battalion  of    the  Thirteenth   Reserve 
Infantry,  Seventh  Reserve  Corps,  April  17,  on  the  depression  of 
Heurias. 

First  line  of  attack,  Second  and  Third  Companies,  side  by  side, 
deployed. 

Second  line  of  attack,  First  and  Fourth  Companies. 

The  first  line  of  attack  formed  three  successive  waves,  each  a 
platoon.  Several  pioneers  were  attached  to  each  wave. 

4.  Attack  of  the  Second  Battalion,  Eighty-seventh  Infantry,  April 
11,  on  the  Bois  de  la  Caillette. 

The  Second  Battalion,  Eighty-seventh  Infantry,  arrived  the  night 
of  the  8th-9th  to  take  up  a  position  in  the  first-line  trenches  toward 
the  north  corner  of  the  Bois  de  la  Caillette.  The  order  of  attack  for 
the  llth  included  taking  the  forward  French  trench  (Trapeze  trench) 
and  forcing  their  way  to  the  supporting  trench. 

Disposition  of  11/87. 

Two  lines  of  attack,  each  formed  by  2  companies,  side  by  side,  the 
Fifth  and  Sixth  Companies  forming  the  first  line. 

The  Fifth  Company  echeloned  in  two  waves  at  30  meters  apart, 
the  first  wave  40  men  strong.  The  attack  was  begun  about  4:40 
p.  m.  The  first  wave  of  the  Fifth  Company  threw  itself  into  an 
advanced  French  trench  where  they  were  cut  off  during  the  evening. 
The  other  waves  were  entirely  mowed  down  by  our  fire.  The  second 
line  of  attack  could  not  (or  would  not)  debouch. 

Attack  exercise  of  the  Second  Battalion,  Two  hundred  and  eighth 
Reserve  Infantry,  XXII  Reserve  Corps. 

The  battalion  recently  carried  out  (beginning  end  of  April) 
the  following  exercises  in  rear  of  the  front  during  rest  periods: 
Company  formed  3,  4,  or  5  waves,  which  left  the  trench,  deployed 
as  skirmishers.  The  first  wave,  as  mission,  taking  the  French 
first-line  trench,  and  getting  within  grenade  throwing  distance  of  the 
second  trench.  There  they  were  to  lie  prone  on  the  ground,  throw 
their  grenades  and  immediately  after  the  explosion  jump  into  the 
trench. 

The  men  each  carried  6  grenades  and  small-size  wire  cutters. 

The  second  wave  had  as  mission  to  reach  the  French  line 
trench.  It  operated  as  the  preceding  one,  and  advanced  when  the 
first  wave  took  that  trench. 

The  third  wave  carried  tools,  picks,  large-size  wire  cutters  and 
additional  defenses. 


38 

The  fourth  carried  a  complement  of  tools  and  food. 

The  attack  was  launched  at  a  given  hour.  Watches  were  regu- 
lated and  the  sortie  of  the  waves  indicated  by  whistles.  The  men 
taking  part  in  the  different  waves  were  appointed  by  name. 

GERMAN  CHARGED  ENTANGLEMENTS. 

(Extracts  from  Intelligence  Bulletin  of  Dec.  13,  1916,  of  Seventh  Army.) 

A  soldier,  specialist  in  the  study  of  charged  entanglements,  who 
was  able  during  a  patrol  to  approach  one  of  these  entanglements  in 
the  "Thur"  Valley,  gives  the  following  information: 

1.  Luminous  haze  and  sparks  are  produced  the  length  of  the 
stakes,  and  on  the  tufts  of  grass  in  contact  with  metal  parts,  succeed- 
ing each  other  without  interruption. 

2.  The  charged  entanglement  presents  the  following  appearance: 
Two  rows  of  stakes,  each  stake  supporting  three  horizontal  support- 
ing wires  of  heavy  barbed  wire.     These  spaced  stakes  (following  the 
directions  on  the  diagram)  have  their  base  soaked  with  tar  matter 
or  coal  tar  in  order  to  increase  the  insulation  of  the  entanglement, 
and  at  the  same  time  avoid  too  rapid  rotting  of  that  part  of  the 
stake  set  in  the  ground. 

The  two  rows  of  stakes  are  opposite  each  other. 

Small  supporting  wires  of  smooth  galvanized  wire  connect  trans- 
versely the  two  rows  of  stakes.  The  interlacing  of  these  supporting 
wires  seems  to  follow  approximately  the  design  marked  on  the 
diagram. 

To  complete  the  entanglement  a  large  double  barbed  wire  (with 
square  sections)  connects  the  two  lines  of  stakes  diagonally.  This 
heavy  wire  is  not  very  tightly  stretched. 

Several  meters  in  front  of  the  charged  entanglement  is  a  large 
smooth  uncharged  wire  mounted  on  stakes  placed  8  or  10  meters 
apart  and  running  parallel  to  the  above. 

Wire  serves  as  a  protection  permitting  patrols  to  pass  between  the 
two  systems  with  safety. 


39 


COMPOSITION   OF  THE  CHARGED   ENTANGLEMENT. 


Of  ELU?S1FZ£:>  taT^CI 


*•»•  *^*-^<«iiSi~jiiXxMa«Lui«iiKi»rttJ  la*u* 
>-*.  a  fti  •«i-=W4<i4?SS^S?^gf«L 


BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  ENTANGLEMENT. 


LEGEND. 
A-  Tarred  posts. 

B.  Supporting  wires  of  American  barbed  wire. 

C.  Strands  of  galvanized  smooth  wire. 

T>.  Diagonal  strands  of  double-barbed  wire. 
E.  Protective  fence  of  heavy  smooth  wire. 


THE  BICYCLE  UNITS. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  war  there  existed  only  a  few  bicycle  units 
one  or  two  of  which  were  chasseur  battalions. 

Since  then  the  number  of  cyclist  companies  has  been  consider- 
ably increased  by  forming  a  company  for  each  of  the  new  divisions 
(division  of  the  Reserve  Corps  XXII,  XXVIII,  XLI;  divisions  of 
the  series  50,  101,  201;  Ersatz  divisions  of  the  series  80,  and  all  the 
Landwehr  divisions). 

Some  of  the  old  divisions,  both  active  and  reserve,  will  also  have 
a  cyclist  company. 

The  cavalry  divisions  do  not  seem  to  have  other  cyclists  than  those 
from  the  chasseur  battalions  assigned  to  them. 

Although  a  new  cyclist  company  has  been  noted  (No.  159)  in  the 
First  D.  C.,  -this  seems  to  be  the  only  case. 

There  are  now  about  200  cyclist  companies. 

Some  of  them  have  been  formed  into  cyclist  battalions. 

A.  THE  CYCLIST  BATTALIONS. 

1.  ORGANIZATION. 

Five  cyclist  battalions  have  been  discovered ;  they  are  numbered 
from  1  to  5.  The  third  battalion  is  Bavarian.  The  first  three 
battalions  are  grouped  and  form  a  brigade  which  has  been  called 
the  second  cyclist  brigade.  The  fourth  and  fifth  battalions  have 
not  been  grouped;  they  appear  to  be  attached  to  the  Eleventh 
Bavarian  Division. 

The  cyclist  battalions  have  four  companies,  each  having  120 
cyclists  in  addition  to  one  machine-gun  company.  They  have 
been  formed  by  grouping  the  existing  companies  of  cyclists  which 
were  chosen  from  either  the  cyclist  companies  of  the  chasseur 
battalions  or  from  the  new  divisions  organized  in  1915. 

2.  EMPLOYMENT. 

The  cyclist  battalions  appeared  simultaneously  on  the  eastern 
and  western  fronts  in  September,  1916. 

(40) 


41 

THE    WESTERN    FRONT. 

Two  battalions  have  beem  formed  on  the  western  front.  In  the 
beginning  they  were  numbered  1  and  2.  They  are  now  the  bat- 
talions 4  and  5,  which  are  on  the  Roumanian  front. 

After  having  received,  in  the  north  of  France,  the  instruction 
given  to  the  assaulting  troops,  these  units  were  used  on  the  Somme 
as  ordinary  infantry  battalions.  (See  Information  Bulletin  of 
Sept.  22.) 

THE    EASTERN   FRONT. 

Three  battalions  have  been  formed  on  the  eastern  front.  They 
are  battalions  Nos.  1,  2,  and  3,  and  form  the  second  cyclist  brigade. 

The  second  cyclist  brigade  fought  during  September  in  the  Car- 
pathians; during  October,  in  the  Dneister  Valley  (in  defense  of 
Halicz)  and  then  again  in  the  Carpathians. 

In  November  this  brigade  was  transferred  to  the  Orsova  district, 
where  it  fought  against  the  elements  of  the  Roumanian  army,  which 
had  been  cut  off  from  their  army  while  defending  this  district  and 
the  sector  of  Vidin. 

At  present  the  second  cyclist  brigade  seems  to  be  in  rear  of  the 
front,  southeast  of  Buzeu. 

The  fourth  and  fifth  cyclist  battalions,  transferred  from  the  Som- 
me district  to  the  eastern  front,  seem  to  have  been  assigned  to  the 
Eleventh  Bavarian  Division,  with  which  they  fought  in  Roumania. 
At  present  they  are  still  with  the  Eleventh  Bavarian  Division, 
which  is  also  southeast  of  Buzeu. 

Up  to  date  the  cyclist  battalions  appear  to  have  been  considered 
as  a  mobile  infantry  reserve,  which  is  at  the  disposal  of  the  large 
infantry  units. 

As  a  rule  they  have  been  used  where  quick  intervention  by  fresh 
troops  was  necessary. 

They  seem  never  to  have  acted  in  liaison  with  a  division  of  cav- 
alry. However,  it  is  possible  that  in  the  future  the  five  cyclist 
battalions  in  question,  which  are  now  in  the  Moldavian  Plain,  near 
the  corps  of  the  Schmettow  cavalry,  may  be  put  at  the  disposal  of 
this  large  unit. 


42 

B.  THE    MACHINE-GUN    COMPANIES    OF    THE    CYCLIST 
BATTALIONS. 

The  following  information,  relating  to  the  organization  of  the 
machine-gun  companies  of  the  cyclist  battalions,  is  taken  from  an 
official  document  which  was  seized  on  the  eastern  front  and  then 
sent  to  the  Russian  staff: 

In  July,  1916,  the  school  for  machine  gunners  at  the  Doberitz 
Camp  had  to  organize  the  machine-gun  companies  for  each  of  the 
first  and  second  cyclist  battalions.  The  Bavarian  ministry  of  war 
had  to  supply  the  company  necessary  to  form  the  third  cyclist 
battalion  (Bavarian). 

I.  The  machine-gun  companies  comprise: 

3  officers,  1  of  whom  commands  the  company. 

62  noncommissioned  officers  and  privates,  namely: 

1  "feldwebel." 

1  "vice  feldwebel." 

6  noncommissioned  officer  gunners. 

1  noncommissioned  officer  armorer. 

1  noncommissioned  officer  hospital  orderly. 
34  "gefreite"  and  soldiers. 

2  noncommissioned  officers  from  the  automobile  service. 
12  mechanics,  automobilists  and  substitutes. 

1  motorcyclist. 

3  "train"  soldiers. 

which  means  the  usual  strength  of  a  machine-gun  company  is  re- 
duced by  1  officer  and  23  men. 

The  machine-gun  companies  have  6  guns  (3  sections  of  '2  guns). 
Its  train  has  only  one  four-wheeled  wagon. 

II.  Means  of  transportation: 

The  company  (personnel  and  materiel)  is  transported  in  auto- 
mobiles, namely: 

1.  One  four-seated  touring  car  for  use  of  the  company  commander. 
For  changes  of  stations  and  reconnaissances  the  other  officers  may 
also  sit  in  this  car;  otherwise  they  go  on  a  truck. 

2.  Five  3-ton  motor  trucks.     The  first  three  trucks  are  for  trans- 
porting the  company.     Each  of  them  carries  two  machine  guns 
with  their  munitions  and  gunners,  which  means  an  entire  section. 
These  three  loaded  trucks  form  the  "Fighting  unit."     When  there 
is  sufficient  room  they  also  carry  the  folding  pushcarts,  which  facili- 
tate the  transportation  of  the  guns  beyond  the  roads  to  which  the 
trucks  are  necessarily  confined. 


43 

The  fourth  truck  is  for  the  baggage,  ammunition,  and  accessories 
(tools,  spare  parts,  etc.).  The  "feldwebel."  the  "vice  feldwebel." 
armorer,  and  noncommissioned  officers,  hospital  orderly,  and  all  the 
extra  personnel  also  ride  on  this  truck. 

Each  gun  is  supplied  with  at  least  15,000  rounds,  the  greater  part 
of  which  is  put  on  the  first  three  trucks. 

The  fifth  truck  carries  the  gasoline  supplies  and  various  materiel. 
The  food,  clothing,  etc.,  should  be  properly  distributed  between 
the  different  wagons. 

III.  Armament  and  equipment: 

All  the  men  are  armed  with  automatic  pistols;  only  the  "train" 
soldiers  carry  carbines. 

The  "feldwebel,"  the  "vice  feldwebel,"  and  the  gunners  are 
supplied  with  field  glasses  of  the  1903  model.  There  is  no  telephone 
apparatus. 


METHOD   OF  THE  GERMANS  IN  ESTABLISHING 
LINES  OF  DEFENSE. 

(Extract  from  Intelligence  Bulletin  of  the  Sixth  Army  of  Dec.  9.) 

The  methods  which  permitted  the  Germans  during  the  course  of 
the  battle  of  the  Somme  to  establish  in  a  minimum  of  time  relatively 
strong  new  lines  of  defense  depended  on  a  number  of  qualities  and 
conditions  which  may  be  summed  up  as  follows: 

Methodical  disposition. 

Practical  ability. 

Specialization. 

Great  demands  upon  troops. 

1.  The  echelonning  in  depth  of  the  troops  occupying  a  sector  is 
the  object  for  the  echelonning  of  successive  positions  of  defense 
already  existing  or  to  be  created.     This  is  a  cardinal  principle  and 
is  carried  out  rigorously.     As  a  result  the  trenches  are  always  con- 
structed or  improved  by  workers  in  the  vicinity. 

As  changes  among  the  battalions  of  the  first  line,  support,  or  re- 
serve, cause  an  inevitable  obstacle  in  the  continuousness  of  work,  this 
inconvenience  is  reduced  to  the  minimum  in  the  following  manner: 

Every  position  in  construction  is  divided  into  several  working 
sections,  usually  corresponding  to  the  sectors  of  regiments.  The 
work  of  each  section  is  permanently  directed  by  an  officer  (usually 
a  lieutenant)  chosen  either  from  the  infantry  regiment  in  whose 
sector  the  working  section  is  located  or  from  a  company  of  pioneers, 
for  distant  positions.  The  permanence  of  this  officer  assures  the  im- 
petus and  continual  supervision  necessary  for  the  rapid  completion 
of  the  work.  This  process  is  not  applicable  to  the  first  line,  where 
the  work  is  directed  by  company  commanders.  At  each  relief  a  de- 
tailed report  is  handed  in,  giving  the  work  already  accomplished, 
work  remaining  to  be  done,  material  on  hand.  etc. 

2.  In  order  to  facilitate  the  transport  of  material  up  to  the  first  posi- 
tion regimental  depots  have  been  formed  in  addition  to  divisional 
depots.     These  former  are  pushed  as  far  ahead  as  possible  and  con- 
tain not  only  material,  implements,  and  wire  necessary  for  the  con- 
struction of  trenches,  but  also  ammunition,  provisions  (preserved 
food,  mineral  water,  solid  alcohol,  etc.).     This  corresponds  to  the 
idea  that  the  units  on  the  first  line  should  find  everything  they  need 
at  the  same  place. 

Transport  up  to  the  first  line  is  accomplished  on  men's  backs. 
The  heaviest  materials,  such  as  shaft  frames,  are  assembled  later. 

(44) 


45 

After  disposing  permanently  of  bearers,  companies  which  were 
normally  organized  in  three  sections  were  split  up  in  4  sections  upon 
their  arrival  on  the  Somme.  The  fourth  section  never  did  any  duty 
on  the  first  line  and  was  entirely  assigned  to  the  transportation,  each 
night,  of  provisions  and  materials. 

3.  To  accomplish  work  demanding  special  knowledge,  the  Germans 
have  organized  special  units,  such  as  the  "Betontrupp"  (charged 
with  constructing  concrete  shelters)  and  "Stollenbaukommando" 
(charged  with  constructing  deep  and  particularly  solid  dugouts). 

4.  Finally  the  work  is  pushed  to  its  greatest  rapidity.     Not  only  is 
the  amount  of  work  demanded  of  each  man  great,  since  the  units  are 
forced  to  contribute  if  they  are  of  the  first  line,  support,  or  reserve, 
but  the  number  of  workers  used  is  very  large. 

Besides  the  troops  in  the  sector  who  construct  the  two  first  positions 
numerous  companies  of  pioneers,  divisions  coming  from  other  parts 
of  the  front  before  their  entrance  into  the  line,  battalions  of  land- 
sturm  troops,  Russian  prisoners,  and  probably  part  of  the  civil 
population  are  used  to  establish  the  positions  farther  in  the  rear 
whose  plan  has  been  determined  upon  by  the  army  and  which  for 
this  reason  is  called  " Heeresstellungen  "  or  "A.  O.  K.  Stellungen" 
("Army  Oberkommando-Stellungen  "). 

NEW    ORGANIZATION    OF   THE    GERMAN    COMPANY    OF 
INFANTRY. 

The  "Proposed  Regulation  for  Instruction  of  Infantry  Troops  in 
the  Field"  of  January,  1917,  suggests  the  organization  of  the  com- 
pany on  the  following  lines: 

I.  COMPOSITION  AND  SUBDIVIDING. 

The  company  is  composed  of  3  platoons  (sections).  The  platoon 
is  commanded  by  an  officer,  or,  in  his  absence,  by  a  sergeant.  It  is 
subdivided  into  squads  (groups). 

The  squad  comprises  4  files  of  2  men  and  is  commanded  by  a 
sergeant  or  a  gefreite  (corporal).  In  war  time  it  forms  a  squad  com- 
manded by  the  squad  leader. 

'\Yhen  the  number  of  squads  is  over  3  the  platoon  is  divided  into 
two  half  platoons. 

The  organization  of  a  fourth  platoon  depends  upon  the  action 
demanded  of  the  company,  whether  resistance  of  long  duration  or 
violent  decisive  action. 

In  the  first  instance  (long  drawn  out  combat)  it  is  wise  to  form  a 
fourth  platoon  comprising  a  certain  number  of  noncommissioned 


46 

officers  (platoon  and  squad  leaders),  and  specialists  (detachments 
for  assault)  (sturmtrupps),  grenadiers,  sharpshooters,  automatic 
riflemen,  and  grenade  throwers.  This  platoon,  maintained  in  re- 
serve, allows  the  company  to  conserve  its  fighting  strength  for  the 
duration  of  the  action. 

In  the  second  instance  (violent,  decisive  action)  noncommissioned 
officers  and  men,  especially  chosen,  can  be  united  in  a  special  platoon 
and  placed  at  the  disposition  of  the  company  commander. 

In  addition  to  its  three  platoons  the  company  includes  a  section  of 
machine  guns  (infantry  machine-gun  trupp)  for  the  automatic  rifles, 
or  a  section  of  light  machine  guns,  which  are  just  now  being  issued. 

To  sum  up,  the  German  company  remains  at  three  platoons  as 
before,  but  the  eventual  formation  of  a  fourth  platoon  is  provided 
for  in  case  of  long-drawn-out  strain  or  particular  violence  of  action. 

Men  using  automatic  rifles  form  a  special  unit  belonging  to  the 
company  but  not  bearing  the  title  of  fourth  platoon. 

II.  MACHINE-GUN  SECTION  (INF.  M.  G.  TRUPP). 

The  section  is  commanded  by  an  officer. 

It  comprises: 

One  experienced  sergeant  taking  duties  of  armament  sergeant.  To 
each  gun,  one  sergeant  or  gefreite  in  charge  of  gun,  four  gunners, 
numbered  1  to  4  (No.  2  is  the  aiming  gunner),  six  guns,  and  one  cart 
for  the  transport  of  guns  and  anmunition. 

All  the  gunners  should  be  trained  in  the  service  of  aiming. 

All  in  the  section  are  armed  with  automatic  pistols. 

The  section  takes  its  place  as  a  rule  at  the  left  of  the  company. 

During  marches  the  material  is  placed  on  the  cart,  which  follows 
immediately  behind  the  section. 

If  the  march  is  known  to  be  long,  two  to  four  horses  are  used. 

In  operation  once  the  material  is  unloaded  the  carrying  is  done 
by  summoning  auxiliary  carriers  furnished  by  the  company. 

The  number  of  carriers  varies.  As  a  rule  a  squad  of  seven  carriers 
and  a  chief  of  squad  is  provided  for  each  gun.  They  carry  ammuni- 
tion and  the  water  jackets  of  the  guns. 

The  guns  being  in  position,  the  squad  of  carriers  becomes  a  squad 
of  combatants  again. 

It  is  to  be  noticed  that  the  present  "Proposed  Regulation"  men- 
tions six  guns  to  a  company  of  infantry.  This  number  does  not  yet 
seem  to  have  been  realized.  An  order  of  the  minister  of  war  dated 
December  12,  1916,  provides  for  the  distribution  of  only  three  gun'/ 
to  a  company  for  the  end  of  February,  1917. 


NOTES  ON  FIELD  RECRUITING  DEPOTS. 

Until  the  beginning  of  1915,  the  young  soldiers  incorporated  into 
the  German  Army  went  directly  from  their  regimental  depot  (Ger- 
man interior)  to  join  their  mobilized  corps  at  the  front.  Since 
February,  1915,  recruits  from  all  quarters,  after  a  training  of  from 
.one  to  three  months  in  the  home  depots,  are  sent  into  field  recruiting 
stations,  a  variety  of  instruction  camp,  where  their  military  educa- 
tion is  completed  and  from  which  they  are  sent  to  the  front  according 
to  need. 

These  "Feldrekruten  depots"  (F.  R.  D.)  are  generally  assigned 
to  a  division,  but  sometimes  to  an  army  corps,  for  which  they  serve  as  a 
near-by  reservoir  for  forces.  Placed  only  a  few  kilometers  from  the 
front  they  can  send  reinforcements  rapidly  in  case  of  important 
losses;  they  can  also  receive — during  periods  of  inactivity — soldiers 
from  the  front  whose  military  training  has  appeared  insufficient  under 
lire.  Numerous  examples  confirm  this  use  of  the  F.  R.  D. 

They  constitute  also  units  to  be  used  eventually  in  the  execution 
of  certain  worka  behind  the  front,  and  they  have  also  been  used — 
as  a  unit  or  in  sections — on  the  front  itself  in  calm  sectors. 

Since  the  F.  R.  D.  follow  the  units  to  which  they  are  assigned, 
in  their  change  of  position  (de'placement)  it  is  probable  that  cadres 
are  exchanged  between  the  regiments  at  the  front  and  the  F.  R.  D., 
which  permits  of  using  for  instruction  officers  and  noncommissioned 
officers  temporarily  unsuited  for  service  at  the  front. 

Because  of  the  frequent  change  of  station  of  German  units  it  has 
not  seemed  necessary  to  include  in  these  notes  the  list  of  the  known 
sites  of  F.  R.  D.  of  the  various  divisions;  however,  it  is  to  be  pre- 
sumed that  the  same  material  organizations  are  successively  .(re- 
peatedly) used  by  the  depots  of  the  divisions  which  replace  each 
oilier  in  the  same  sector  and  for  this  reason  a  knowledge  of  their 
whereabouts  is  of  interest  and  should  be  turned  over  to  the  second 
bureau  of  general  headquarters. 

.  The  strength  of  F.  R.  D.  is  essentially  variable  because  of  their 
rt")le  of  reservoir;  on  an  average,  however,  they  appear  to  comprise 
a  battalion  of  from  4  to  6  companies  of  200  men  to  a  division. 

They  generally  receive  their  recruits  simultaneously  from  the, 
depots  of  all  the  regiments  of  the  division;  these  arrive  periodically 
on  one  "Sammeltransport."  At  times,  however,  the  F.  R.  D.  draw 

(47) 


48 

their  resources  from  a  region  other  than  their  normal  recruiting 
ground ;  it  was  in  this  way  that  the  depot  of  the  Thirty-fourth  Divi- 
sion received  600  Bavarians  in  the  beginning  of  September,  1916.  - 
The  resources  of  the  F.  R.  D.  are  distributed  according  to  need, 
without  regard  to  their  origin,  among  regiments  which  have  vacan- 
cies to  be  filled;  there  is  cited  the  sending  of  reinforcements  from 
the  F.  R.  D.  of  one  division  to  the  regiments  of  another  division 
at  the  front. 


THE  LIGHT  MACHINE  GUNS  RECENTLY  PUT  INTO 
SERVICE  IN  THE  GERMAN  INFANTRY. 

The  Russian  staff  communicates  the  following  information  on  the 
new  machine  guns  whose  existence  has  been  known  to  the  Intelli- 
gence Service  since  October  12. 

The  section  of  light  machine  guns  (Leichter  Maschinengewehr 
Trttpp)  comprises  3  groups  of  3  guns  each. 

Each  gun  is  manned  by  3  men  plus  1  in  addition.  On  the  firing 
line  one  man  carries  the  gun  and  the  two  others  transport  together 
2,000  cartridges. 

During  marches  guns  and  ammunition  are  loaded  on  the  carriages 
of  the  combat  train. 

The  section  is  commanded  by  an  officer  or  provisional  officer  and 
the  group  by  a  sergeant. 

The  light  machine  gun  is  of  the  Bergmann  system,  1915  model, 
manufactured  at  Spandau. 

This  gun  was  intended  for  aviation,  but  mounted  on  an  aeroplane 
proved  impractical  from  a  technical  point  of  view  (worked  irregu- 
larly during  flight). 

The  gun  is  air  cooled,  but  is  not  effective  after  250  or  300  rounds  of 
constant  fire.  For  this  reason  the  guns  have  been  grouped  in  threes, 
firing  alternately  a  series  of  30  shots,  giving  the  impression  of  fire 
executed  by  a  single  gnu. 


A  prisoner  has  declared  that  at  the  camp  of  Deberitz  there  are 
about  4,000  guns  and  that  their  manufacture  will  be  stopped. 

This  information  is  to  be  compared  with  some  other  which  says 
that  2,000  men  armed  with  automatic  rifles  left  Deberitz  for  the 
eastern  front  before  October  1  and  that  2,000  men  were  still,  about 
the  10th  of  October,  undergoing  a  course  of  instruction  in  this  same 
camp  in  the  use  of  automatic  rifles. 


It  is  to  be  remembered  that  64  sections  of  light  machine  guns, 
about  576  guns,  have  already  been  located,  and  that  the  14  sections 
"vhose  assignment  is  known  are  all  on  the  eastern  front. 

(49) 


50 

GERMAN  HELMET  FOR  LOOKOUTS. 


The  new  German  helmet  for  lookout?,  already  referred  to  at 
various  times,  is  composed  of  two  parts — the  helmet  proper,  the  re- 
inforcing plate  in  front. 

The  helmet  is  of  steel,  made  in  one  piece,  and  comes  down  much 
lower  in  back  than  in  front.  It  is  painted  gray,  has  no  kind  of 
ornament,  and  has  a  stud  on  each  side. 

Dimensions  of  the  helmet:  Height,  16  centimeters;  length  (at  its 
base),  31.5  centimeters;  thickness  of  the  steel,  about  0.15  centimeter; 
weight,  1.175  kilograms. 

The  reinforcing  plate  in  front  covers  about  half  the  helmet;  it  has 
two  slots  designed  to  fit  over  the  studs  on  the  side  of  the  helmet, 
and  a  leather  strap  with  a  small  buckle,  which  passes  about  the  back 
of  the  helmet  and  allows  the  plate  to  be  firmly  adjusted.  It  is  of 
very  thick  steel;  also  painted  gray. 

Thickness  of  the  plate,  from  0.45  to  0.50  centimeters;  weight  of 
the  plate,  2.08  kilograms. 

The  complete  helmet  is  apparently  and  actually  very  heavy, 
weighing  3.255  kilograms. 

We  are  still  without  information  as  to  the  protection  it  affords 
against  a  rifle  bullet;  we  believe  that  it  assures  adequate  safety  at 
an  inconsiderable  distance. 


A     000550158     o 


NOTES  ON  LIGHT  INFANTRY  TRENCH  MORTARS 
AND  MACHINE  GUNS. 

(Translation  from  a  German  Document.    One  Hundred  and  eighty-third  Infantry 
Division,  Headquarters  of  the  Division,  March  27, 1917.) 

1.  From  the  maps  of  the  light  trench  mortar  battery  positions  that 
haAre  reached  me  I  note  that  these  weapons  are  not  used  in  suffi- 
cient numbers  in  the  infantry  positions. 

In  each  regimental  sector  the  12  light  trench  mortars  of  the  regi- 
ment must  be  placed  in  line,  as  far  as  possible.  The  instruction  of 
new  gunners  can  be  given  with  trench  mortars  in  position  in  many 
parts  of  the  actual  sector  of  the  division.  There  is  no  inconven- 
ience in  removing  them  slightly  to  the  rear  during  exercise  hours. 
It  is  in  firing  on  the  enemy  that  the  gunners  will  best  acquire  the 
habit  of  fire.  Thus,  after  they  have  learned  the  handling  of  the 
pieces,  with  the  trench  mortars  withdrawn  to  the  rear;  they  can 
acquire  practice  with  the  pieces  in  action.  It  is  the  business  of  the 
regiment  to  provide  a  sufficient  number  of  trained  men  to  form  a 
regular  relief. 

I  particularly  draw  attention  to  the  advantage  of  the  cooperation 
of  trench  mortars  with  the  neighboring  trench  mortars,  outside  of 
their  sectors,  even  if  these  mortars  belong  to  another  division. 

It  can  easily  happen  that  only  a  small  number  of  trench  mortara 
are  in  use  in  one  sector,  because  the  larger  part  of  the  position  is 
too  far  removed  from  the  enemy's  lines,  while  the  reverse  may  bo 
true  of  the  neighboring  sector.  In  this  case  the  sector  commanderg 
should  arrange  to  mutually  support  each  other.  It  may  therefore 
occur  that  the  trench  mortars  and  their  personnel  are  placed  under 
the  orders  of  another  sector  commander. 

Regarding  the  battery  formations  of  light  trench  mortars,  I  again 
mention  that  they  must  be  placed  in  groups  of  at  least  four,  under 
a  single  commander,  taking  the  range  into  account,  so  that,  being 
placed  behind  the  first,  or  better  still,  behind  the  second  line,  they 
may  be  less  exposed  to  loss  or  destruction. 

In  regard  to  the  placing  of  machine  guns,  the  following  is  recom-. 
mended: 

They  must  only  be  placed  in  chance  shelters  (shell  holes,  etc.), 
in  exceptional  cases,  and  only  during  combat.  During  a  period  of 
inactivity  care  of  the  material  necessitates  a  carefully  constructed 

machine-gun  shelter. 

(51) 


52 

Substitute  emplacement  for  machine  guns  should  be  so  placed  as 
to  offer  the  same  facilities  or  on  the  same  target  as  the  principal 
emplacement.  If  this  is  not  done,  a  substitute  emplacement  can  no 
Iong3r  be  considered  as  such;  it  is  thus  a  supplementary  emplace- 
ment, permitting  of  fire  on  other  targets.  Generally  the  range  is 
limited  to  200  or  300  meters  from  an  emergency  mount.  This 
mount  can  therefore  be  used  only  in  places  (particularly  in  the  first- 
line  trenches)  where  the  targets  are  generally  within  this  range.  In 
all  positions  farther  to  the  rear,  and  in  the  intermediate  positions, 
fire  must  be  from  a  sledge-carriage,  in  order  to  use  the  maximum 
range  of  the  machine  gun. 

The  measures  taken  for  firing  at  low-fiying  aeroplanes  are  in 
most  cases  insufficient.  On  this  account  the  emergency  mounts 
should  be  fastened  to  a  tree  trunk  or  pib.  The  earth  should  be 
dug  around  the  pile  sufficiently  deep  so  that  the  gunner  can  work 
the  gun  all  around  the  pile.  It  is  only  in  positions  very  near  to  the 
enemy  that  this  proceeding  is  not  always  possible,  but  every  effort 
must  be  made  to  accomplish  it. 

A  supply  of  hand  grenades  should  be  placed  in  the  machine-gun 
shelters.  The  exact  number  can  not  be  generally  determined,  as 
it  depends  on  the  emplacement  of  the  gun.  In  any  case,  the  sup- 
ply should  be  such  that  the  gunners  can  protect  themselves  with 
grenades  during  repairs  on  the  guns,  and  such  that,  in  certain  cases, 
grenade  combat  may  permit  them  to  remove  their  piece  to  rear. 

(Signed)  v  SCHUSSLER. 

o 


